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Abstract: Cognitive radio network (CRN) enables unlicensed users (or secondary users, SUs) to sense for and 
opportunistically operate in underutilized licensed channels, which are owned by the licensed users (or 
primary users, PUs). Cognitive radio network (CRN) has been regarded as the next-generation wireless 
network centred on the application of artificial intelligence, which helps the SUs to learn about, as well as to 
adaptively and dynamically reconfigure its operating parameters, including the sensing and transmission 
channels, for network performance enhancement. This motivates the use of artificial intelligence to enhance 
security schemes for CRNs. Provisioning security in CRNs is challenging since existing techniques, such as 
entity authentication, are not feasible in the dynamic environment that CRN presents since they require pre-
registration. In addition these techniques cannot prevent an authenticated node from acting maliciously. In this 
article, we advocate the use of reinforcement learning (RL) to achieve optimal or near-optimal solutions for 
security enhancement through the detection of various malicious nodes and their attacks in CRNs. RL, which 
is an artificial intelligence technique, has the ability to learn new attacks and to detect previously learned ones. 
RL has been perceived as a promising approach to enhance the overall security aspect of CRNs. RL, which 
has been applied to address the dynamic aspect of security schemes in other wireless networks, such as 
wireless sensor networks and wireless mesh networks can be leveraged to design security schemes in CRNs. 
We believe that these RL solutions will complement and enhance existing security solutions applied to CRN 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first survey article that focuses on the use of RL-based techniques 
for security enhancement in CRNs. 
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1 Introduction 
Cognitive radio (CR) [1, 2] is the next-generation wireless communication system that promises to 
address the artificial spectrum scarcity issue resulting from the traditional static spectrum allocation 
policy through dynamic spectrum access. With dynamic spectrum access, unlicensed users, or secondary 
users (SUs), can opportunistically exploit underutilized spectrum owned by the licensed users or primary 
users (PUs). Hence, CRs can improve the overall spectrum utilization by improving bandwidth 
availability at SUs. To achieve these functions, artificial intelligence (AI) techniques have been adopted 
in CR so that the SUs can sense, learn, and adapt to the dynamic network conditions, in which the PUs’ 
and malicious users’ activities appear and reappear. Cognitive radio networks (CRNs) can operate in both 
centralized and distributed settings: a centralized CRN consists of a SU base station (or access point) that 
communicates with SU nodes while a distributed network consists of SU nodes that communicate with 
each other in an ad-hoc manner. 
CRNs rely on cooperation for much of their functionality. While such a reliance on cooperative 
algorithms can make CRNs more efficient, this also opens CRNs up to numerous security vulnerabilities. 
One of the important requirements of CRNs is that SUs must minimize harmful interference to PUs. This 
requires SUs to collaborate amongst themselves to perform channel sensing and make accurate final 
decision on the availability of a channel. However, such collaboration among SUs may pose a security 
challenge to the SUs’ trustworthiness. For instance, in collaborative channel sensing, the legitimate (or 
honest) SUs depend highly on the dynamic allocation of a common control channel (CCC), which is used 
for the exchange of control messages during normal operations. However, the collaborating SUs may be 
malicious, and they may intentionally provide false sensing outcomes to interfere with the PUs or the 
other SUs, as well as to launch jamming attacks on the CCC, which adversely impacts performance and 
causes transmissions to come to a halt [3]. Hence, such SUs need to be detected and ignored in 
collaboration. The aforementioned discussion highlights that CRNs are susceptible to various attacks, 
such as channel jamming, eavesdropping or packets alteration. Further details on CRNs vulnerabilities, 
attacks and security threats can be found in detailed survey articles on this topic [4 – 6]. 
The main security challenge in a CRN is that it operates in a dynamic set of licensed and 
unlicensed channels (in contrast to traditional wireless networks that typically operate with a fixed set of 
limited channels). In addition, the dynamic nature of the activities of PUs and malicious nodes requires 
SUs to change their operating channels from time to time: hence, longer-term knowledge is necessary so 
that SUs do not oscillate or constantly switch their actions within a short period of time. With this 
inherent characteristic, a mechanism to manage and learn from the ever-changing environment is needed 
to tackle the security challenge. 
Reinforcement learning (RL) is an artificial intelligence (AI) approach that helps a decision maker 
(or agent) to learn the optimal action through repeated interaction with the operating environment [7]. RL 
is an unsupervised and intelligent approach that enables an agent to observe and learn about the static or 
dynamic operating environment in the absence of guidance, feedback or the expected response from 
supervisors (or external critics), and subsequently make decisions on action selection in order to achieve 
optimal or near-optimal system performance. RL has been adopted in the literature [8 – 16] because it 
does not require prior knowledge of channel availability and it is highly adaptive to the dynamicity of 
channels characteristics. In addition, it enables decision makers (or agents) to learn and subsequently 
achieve near-optimal or optimal solutions in the dynamic environment that may be complex and large-
scale in nature [7, 8, 16, 17]. RL has been applied as an alternative to the traditional policy-based 
approach for system performance enhancement. The policy-based approach requires an agent to follow a 
set of static and predefined rules on action selection, and it has been traditionally applied to a wide range 
of application schemes in wireless networks [18]. 
Several AI approaches, such as RL, artificial neural networks, rule-based system and game-based 
approaches, have been applied in CRNs to address the security challenge. A comparison of the strengths 
and limitations of these AI-based security approaches is presented in [19]. In this article, we will focus on 
RL-based security enhancements in CRNs.   
In the following, we will present some advantages of the application of RL to security 
enhancement in CRNs:  
a) RL enables SUs to learn from experience without using an accurate model of the 
operating environment, and even without using any model, allowing the nodes to adapt 
to their dynamic and uncertain operating environment [20 – 22]. Through adaptation, 
RL is useful in the identification of SUs’ behavior, such as honest SUs that turn 
malicious [23]. In practice, an issue is that, obtaining the model is a complex 
procedure that requires high amount of processing and storage capabilities. The issue 
of obtaining an appropriate model is faced by many AI schemes, such as game theory 
(which has been applied to address jamming attacks [24 – 26]) and belief propagation 
(which has been applied to address primary user emulation attacks [27]). Using RL 
helps to solve this issue since RL can be applied in a model-free manner.  
b) RL enables SUs to make decisions based on a series of actions made, with the notion 
of maximizing long-term reward, which is more efficient. Using RL helps to solve the 
performance efficiency issue associated with the game-based approaches, particularly 
one-shot or repetitive games (e.g., potential game and matrix game), that have been 
applied to address jamming and primary user emulation attacks [24, 28, 29].  
c) RL enables SUs to explore new operating environment and exploit the knowledge 
gained so far. An issue is that, SUs may converge to a sub-optimal joint action when 
one of these conditions happens: actions with severe negative rewards exist or multiple 
high performance actions exist [30]. Using RL helps to solve such issue found in 
game-based approaches since RL has the flexibility to fine tune its policy as time 
progresses. 
In spite of the advantages being offered by RL, the application of RL to security enhancement has 
been limited as compared to other application schemes in wireless networks [31] such as routing, 
scheduling and topology management. Other machine learning algorithms, such as artificial neural 
networks, support vector machines and K-means have been widely discussed in [32] to tackle CR 
problems such as malicious SUs reporting inaccurate sensing outcomes in spectrum sensing. While there 
have been separate surveys on the security aspects of CRNs [4, 6, 17] and the application of RL to CRNs 
[33], there is lack of a comprehensive survey on the intersection of these two topics. This motivates our 
study of RL-based security enhancement schemes in CRNs in which we specifically focus on the 
application of RL as an effective tool to address security issues and provide security enhancement in 
CRNs. However, due to its novelty, we have also discussed RL models and algorithms applied in wireless 
sensor networks (WSNs) and wireless mesh networks (WMNs) in order to leverage to their RL 
approaches in CRNs. 
For clarity, the acronyms used throughout this article are summarized in Table 1; and the generic 
and specific notations applied in RL models (see Section 4), are presented in Table 2 and Table 3. Note 
that, the generic notations cover the essential representations of RL, while the specific notations cover the 
additional representations to improve RL.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of RL and its 
representations. Section 3 presents a taxonomy of RL for security enhancement in CRNs with a minor 
focus on other kinds of wireless networks, such as WSNs and WMNs. Section 4 presents a survey on the 
application of RL to security enhancement schemes in CRNs with a minor focus on other kinds of 
wireless networks, such as WSNs and WMNs. Section 5 provides a discussion on RL performance and 
complexities. Section 6 presents design consideration for RL models applied to security enhancement 
schemes. Section 7 discusses open issues. Finally, we provide conclusions in Section 8. 
 
 
Table 1 Acronyms used in this article. 
Acronym Description 
AI Artificial intelligence 
CCC Common control channel 
CR Cognitive radio 
CRN Cognitive radio network 
MARL Multi-agent reinforcement learning 
PHC Policy hill-climbing 
PU Primary user 
RL Reinforcement learning 
SU Secondary user 
TRM Trust and reputation management 
WMN Wireless mesh network 
WoLF Win-or-learn-fast 
WSN Wireless sensor network 
 




















Notation Description Example representations Reference Section 
𝜏 One time unit One time unit can be either a time slot Δ 𝑡, a time window 𝑡 or an episode 𝑒𝜏   
𝜀 Exploration probability    
𝛼 Learning rate    
𝛾 Discount factor    
𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 State 𝑗 observed by node 𝑖 at time 
𝜏 
State set 𝑆 represents four sub-states including the presence of PU in a spectrum, 
node 𝑖’s gain, the number of jammed control channels in the spectrum, and the 
number of jammed data channels in the spectrum 
Wang et al. [39] 4.2 
State set 𝑆 represents the channel conditions whether PU occupies the channel, a 
malicious SU jams the channel or there is successful transmission in the channel 
Wu et al. [48] 4.3 
State set 𝑆 represents whether channel is not occupied or not occupied by a PU Lo et al. [49] 4.4 
State set 𝑆 represents the reputation values of a neighbor node Maneenil et al. [36] 4.5.2 
𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 Action 𝑘 taken by node 𝑖 at time 𝜏 Action set 𝐴 represents the choice of potential SU collaborator nodes Vučević et al. [38] 4.1 
Action set 𝐴 represents the choice of transmissions in control and data channels Wang et al. [39] 4.2 
Action set 𝐴 represents the choice of staying or switching a channel Wu et al. [48] 4.3 
Action set 𝐴 represents the number of CCCs selected for transmission Lo et al. [49] 4.4 
Action set 𝐴 represents the choice of upstream nodes Mistry et al. [43] 4.5.1(a) 
Action set 𝐴 represents the choice of potential collaborator nodes Mukherjee et al. [53] 4.5.1(b) 
Action set 𝐴 represents the  choice of potential neighbor nodes to forward packets 
to destination 





𝑖 )∈ 𝑅 
Delayed reward 𝑚 received by 
node 𝑖 at time 𝜏 + 1 after taking 
action 𝑘 in state 𝑗 at time 𝜏 
Reward set 𝑅 represents the number of false alarms made by a SU collaborator 
node within a time window  
Vučević et al. [38] 4.1 
Reward set 𝑅 represents the spectrum gain when the selected channel is unjammed Wang et al. [39] 4.2 
Reward set 𝑅 represents the channel gain for selecting an unjammed channel Wu et al. [48] 4.3 
Reward set 𝑅 represents the number of valid CCCs that are not occupied by PUs, 
jammed-free and common to SUs selected for transmission 
Lo et al. [49] 4.4 
Reward set 𝑅 represents the reputation value of an upstream node Mistry et al. [43] 4.5.1(a) 
Reward set 𝑅 represents the reputation value of potential collaborator nodes Mukherjee et al. [43] 4.5.1(b) 
Reward set 𝑅 represents a constant value to be rewarded to all nodes within a route 
after an episode 




𝑖 ) Q-value of action 𝑘 in state 𝑗 at 
time 𝜏 
Learnt action value that is updated using previous Q-value, delayed reward and 
discounted reward  
Equation (1) 2.1 
𝜋𝑖,∗(𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 ) Optimal policy for node 𝑖 in state 𝑗 
at time 𝜏 




𝑖 ) State value for node 𝑖 in state 𝑗 
operated under node 𝑖’s policy at 
time 𝜏 
   
 
     
  
Table 3 Specific notations for RL models and algorithms. 
Model Notation Description 
RL with 
suitability 
value [38]  
𝑁𝑘,𝜏
𝑖  Number of false alarms made by node 𝑖’s collaborator node 𝑘 within a time window 𝜏 = 𝑡 
𝜋𝑘,𝜏





𝑖  The presence of PU in spectrum 𝑗 of node 𝑖 at time slot 𝜏 = Δ 𝑡 
𝑔𝑗,𝜏
𝑖  The gain of PU in spectrum 𝑗 received by node 𝑖 at time slot 𝜏 = Δ 𝑡 
𝐻𝑗,𝐶,𝜏
𝑖  The number of jammed control channels in spectrum 𝑗 observed by node 𝑖 at time slot 𝜏 = ∆ 𝑡 
𝐻𝑗,𝐷,𝜏
𝑖  The number of jammed data channels in spectrum 𝑗 observed by node 𝑖 at time slot  𝜏 =  Δ 𝑡 
𝜋∗(𝑠𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 ) The optimal policy for node 𝑖 in spectrum 𝑗 at time slot 𝜏 = ∆ 𝑡 
𝑉(𝑠𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 ) The state value node 𝑖 in spectrum 𝑗 at time slot 𝜏 = ∆ 𝑡 




𝑅 The successful transmission gain  
𝐶 The cost of switching to unutilized or unjammed channel  






 The number of valid CCCs which are unoccupied by PUs, jammed-free and common to SUs selected for packet 
transmission 
𝛿 The step size for policy update 
RL with  
discount 
factor 𝛾 = 0 
[43,53] 
𝑄𝑡ℎ Q-value threshold 
𝑝𝑘,𝜏
𝑖  The number of accurate final decisions at time window 𝜏 = 𝑡 when node 𝑘 is chosen by node 𝑖 
𝑞𝑘,𝜏
𝑖  The number of inaccurate final decisions at time window 𝜏 = 𝑡 when node 𝑘 is chosen by node 𝑖 
𝜀𝑘,𝜏
𝑖  The relative error at time window 𝜏 = 𝑡 when node 𝑘 is chosen by node 𝑖 
𝜇𝑖 The mean of the predicted errors of node 𝑖 
𝜎𝑖 The standard deviation of the predicted errors of node 𝑖 
 
  
2 Reinforcement Learning 
This section presents the generic model and algorithm, as well as the flowchart, of a popular RL 
approach, namely Q-learning. This section serves as a foundation for more advanced RL models and 
algorithms applied to security enhancement schemes presented in Section 4. 
Q-learning is an on-line algorithm in RL [7, 34]. On-line learning enables an agent to learn in an 
interactive manner with the operating environment as the agent operates. Figure 1 shows an abstract view 
of RL, which can embedded in an agent (or a SU). RL consists of three main elements, namely state, 
action and reward. The state, which is observed from the operating environment, represents the factors 
that affect the way in which an agent makes a decision (e.g., the availability of a spectrum in an anti-
jamming scheme). The state may not be represented in some RL models as the changes to the 
environment do not affect an agent’s action selection, and hence, such model is called stateless. The 
reward represents the performance metrics to be maximized (e.g., detection rate), or minimized (e.g., 
probabilities of false positive and false negative). The action represents an action taken by an agent in 
order to maximize its reward (e.g., the choice of control and data channels to transmit messages in an 
anti-jamming scheme). For instance, with respect to a security enhancement scheme that applies 
reputation, state 𝑠𝑗∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 represents the reputation value of a neighbor node 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, where 𝐽 represents the 
set of neighbor nodes of node 𝑖 [35, 36], action 𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝑡
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 represents the selection of a neighbor node 𝑘 
by node 𝑖 to forward packets towards destination [35, 36], and reward 𝑟𝑚∈𝑀,𝜏
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 )  = +1 represents a 
constant value to be rewarded to all nodes in a route after an episode 𝑒𝜏, which is the time required to 
establish a route. This means that a selected node for a route will only receive its reward after a route has 
been established [35, 36]. Note that, the reward may be received at every episode 𝑒𝜏+1, which is 
comprised of a number of time instants, or at every time instant 𝜏 . As an example for the latter case, a 
node 𝑖 chooses sub-channel 𝑘 at time 𝜏 and receives reward 𝑟𝑘,𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑎𝜏
𝑖 )  = (S/N), which represents a 
signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) value, at time 𝜏 + 1 [37]. In the rest of this subsection, to enhance the 
readability, the notations are simplified by considering a single SU in the operating environment. For 
instance, we write state 𝑠𝜏 to represent state 𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖  although both refer to the state. 
 Figure 1: Abstract view of a RL agent in its operating environment for each learning cycle. 
 
 
Q-learning estimates the Q-values of state-action pairs 𝑄𝜏(𝑠𝜏, 𝑎𝜏). For each state-action pair, an 
agent observes its short-term reward 𝑟𝜏+1(𝑠𝜏+1, 𝑎𝜏), and learns its future reward as time progresses. The 
short-term reward 𝑟𝜏+1(𝑠𝜏+1, 𝑎𝜏) is received at time 𝜏 + 1 after an agent has taken the action 𝑎𝜏 at time 𝜏. 
The future reward 𝛾max
𝑎∈𝐴
𝑄𝜏(𝑠𝜏+1, 𝑎) represents the cumulative rewards received by an agent at time  𝜏 +
1, 𝜏 + 2,⋯ [7]. The short-term reward is called the “delayed reward” in RL terminology while the future 
reward is called the “discounted reward”. The Q-value 𝑄𝜏(𝑠𝜏, 𝑎𝜏) is updated as follows: 
 




where the learning rate 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 determines the extent to which the newly acquired knowledge 
overrides the previously learnt Q-value 𝑄𝜏(𝑠𝜏, 𝑎𝜏); and the discount factor 0 ≤ 𝛾 ≤ 1 emphasizes on the 
importance of future rewards. The higher the learning rate 𝛼, the greater the current learnt Q-value 
overrides its old value, and this speeds up the learning process which may lead to faster convergence; 
however, this may destabilize the learning process causing the agent fail to converge. On the other hand, 
the lower the learning rate 𝛼, the smoother the learning process albeit at the potential cost of convergence 
taking longer. If 𝛼 = 1, an agent considers the most current Q-value only. The higher the discount factor 
𝛾, the greater the agent relies on the discounted reward, which is the maximum Q-value of the next state-
(1) 
action pair. If 𝛾 = 1, an agent considers the same weightage for both delayed and discounted rewards. If 
𝛾 = 0, the agent only considers maximizing the short-term delayed reward, and in this case, it is called a 
myopic approach. 
The state-action pairs and their respective delayed and discounted rewards are represented by Q-
values, which are kept in a two-dimensional |𝑆| × |𝐴| Q-table. The action taken is based either on an 
optimal policy 𝜋∗ (using “exploitation” in the RL terminology) or a random policy (called “exploration”). 
When an agent selects an appropriate action for a particular state, the agent receives positive delayed 
reward, and so the respective Q-value increases, and vice-versa. Hence, in order to maximize the 
cumulative reward  𝑉𝜋
∗
(𝑠𝜏) (or the value function) over a period of time, an agent learns to take the 
optimal or near-optimal policy 𝜋∗ (or a series of actions), which has the optimal Q-value given a 
particular state as follows: 
 
 






Hence, the optimal policy is 
 





Both exploration and exploitation complement each other. To explore, an agent takes random 
actions. While this may result in lesser accumulation of reward in the short term, it may lead to the 
discovery of an action that yields better accumulated rewards in the future. There are two popular 
exploration policies, namely 𝜀-greedy and softmax action selection approaches. The 𝜀-greedy policy 
chooses exploration actions with a small probability 𝜀 and exploitation actions with probability 1 − 𝜀. 
The softmax policy, on the other hand, chooses exploitation actions with probability 
𝑒𝑄𝑡(𝑎) 𝑇⁄ ∑ 𝑒𝑄𝑡(𝑏) 𝑇⁄
|𝐴|
𝑏=1⁄ , where 𝑄𝜏(𝑠, 𝑎) represents the knowledge (or Q-value) of state 𝑠 and action 𝑎 at 
time 𝜏, and 𝑇 represents temperature. Higher 𝑇 increases exploration rate while lower 𝑇 increases 
 (2) 
(3) 
exploitation rate, and so the temperature is reduced as time goes by. To exploit, an agent chooses an 
action that has the highest Q-value using Equation (3) to provide the highest possible accumulated 
reward. To achieve an optimal or near-optimal performance, a balanced trade-off between exploration and 
exploitation is required. Hence, RL is suitable for most problems that require an agent to learn and re-
learn from an uncertain or changing operating environment in order to achieve a given goal.  
As seen from Algorithm 1 and Figure 1(a), at time 𝜏 an agent observes the current state 𝑠𝜏, 
chooses and executes an action 𝑎𝜏  for the current state 𝑠𝜏. We consider the 𝜀-greedy approach in this 
case. At time 𝜏 + 1, an agent receives delayed reward 𝑟𝜏+1(𝑠𝜏+1, 𝑎𝜏), which is the consequence of its 
action 𝑎𝜏 at time 𝜏 (see Fig 1(b)). The agent also observes the state 𝑠𝜏+1 to identify its discounted reward 
𝛾max
𝑎∈𝐴
𝑄𝜏(𝑠𝜏+1, 𝑎). The Q-value 𝑄𝜏(𝑠𝜏, 𝑎𝜏) for state 𝑠𝜏 and action 𝑎𝜏 is updated using the delayed and 
discounted rewards 𝑟𝜏+1(𝑠𝜏+1) is updated using Equation (1). The iteration repeats until the Q-values 
converge. 
 
Algorithm 1 Q-Learning algorithm. 
Repeat 
a) Observe current state 𝑠𝜏 
Determine exploration or exploitation 
i. If exploration, choose a random action 
ii. If exploitation, choose the best known action using Equation (3) 
b) Choose action 𝑎𝜏 
c) Receive 𝑟𝜏+1(𝑠𝜏+1) 
d) For state-action pair (𝑠𝜏, 𝑎𝜏), update 𝑄𝜏(𝑠𝜏, 𝑎𝜏) using Equation (1) 
 
 
Figure 2 represents Algorithm 1 as a flowchart with the respective step in the algorithm shown in 
the figure. The flowchart has been prepared for ease of comparison with the flowcharts for various RL 
algorithms presented in Section 4. 
 Figure 2: Q-learning flowchart. 
 
 
3. Security Enhancement Taxonomy in Cognitive Radio Networks 
In this section, we discuss the security vulnerabilities associated with CRNs and application schemes, 
with a minor focus on WSNs and WMNs. Our discussion covers the application and security 
enhancement schemes, the types of attacks as well as the challenges, characteristics, and performance 
metrics associated with the different security enhancement schemes. To provide further insights on this 
topic, and to make our article comprehensive in order to leverage on additional RL schemes, we also 
discuss RL models and algorithms applied to security enhancement schemes in WSNs and WMNs. A 
taxonomy of RL for wireless security enhancement is shown in Figure 3, and it is discussed in the rest of 
this section.  
 Figure 3: Taxonomy of RL in wireless networks for security enhancement 
 
 
3.1 Types of wireless networks and application schemes 
Generally speaking, there are two types of application schemes with security vulnerabilities in which RL 
has been applied to address in CRNs as follows: 
P.1 Channel sensing. CR uses channel sensing technique, such as energy detection, to 
sense for white spaces. Generally speaking, exploration enables SUs to detect the white 
spaces at the earliest possible time, while exploitation enables SUs to efficiently access 
and utilize the channel(s) [38]. 
P.2 Channel access.  CR enables SUs to opportunistically access underutilized channels 
without causing unacceptable interference to the PUs’ activities. While this mechanism 
enables SUs to maximize the usage of the underutilized channels, it poses some 
security vulnerabilities whereby the malicious SUs can do likewise with the intention 
to jam the channels so as to deprive honest SUs from accessing the channels [39].  
3.1.1. Other wireless networks 
In this subsection, we describe RL-based applications in WSNs and WMNs in which the RL models and 
algorithms applied to these networks can be leveraged to design security schemes in CRNs. 
3.1.1.1 Wireless mesh networks  
Wireless mesh network (WMN) is a wireless network where each node can communicate directly with 
one or more neighbor nodes in the absence of fixed network infrastructure [40]. The nodes are made up of 
mesh routers and mesh clients that help to forward packets in multiple hops. A WMN is self-organized 
and self-configured in nature, in which the nodes can automatically establish and maintain connectivity 
among themselves throughout a distributed and dynamic network. RL has been applied to address the 
security vulnerabilities for the routing application in WMNs as explained below: 
P.3 Routing. In WMNs, nodes rely on forwarding by their neighboring nodes for packet 
delivery through multi-hop routing/ forwarding. A WMN is vulnerable to attacks as 
some nodes in the route may be malicious.  As such, it is vital to ensure that nodes in a 
route are non-malicious. In previous work, RL has been applied to select a next-hop 
neighbor node [36]. 
3.1.1.2 Wireless sensor networks 
Wireless sensor network (WSN) comprises autonomous sensor nodes that collaboratively monitor the 
surrounding environment. The nodes send their sensing outcomes to a sink node that performs data fusion 
and make final decision on sensing outcomes. Sensor nodes are mostly battery powered and energy 
constrained. In addition, the limited computational capability and memory of sensor nodes, along with its 
energy-constrained nature, means that there is a high probability of node failure [41, 42]. Thus, even 
though the sensor nodes are mostly stationary, the topology of WSNs can be dynamic due to node failure. 
In WSNs, RL has been applied to address the following application scheme with potential security 
vulnerabilities: 
P.4 Data sensing/reporting. In WSNs, a sensor node must ensure the accuracy of the final 
decision on sensing outcomes. This requires both the sensor nodes and their respective 
upstream sensor nodes leading to sink nodes to be trustworthy. In previous work, RL 
has been applied to select honest upstream nodes [43]. 
3.2 Types of attacks  
There are six distinct types of attacks that RL has been applied to address: 
A.1 Byzantine attack. In this attack, malicious nodes appear to be honest nodes [23] and 
use their privilege to disrupt the communication of other nodes in the network without 
consideration of its own resource consumption [44]. As the malicious nodes appear to 
be honest, it can generate some mistrust amongst honest nodes.  
A.2 Unintentional attack. In this attack, non-malicious nodes unintentionally launch attacks 
(e.g., generating inaccurate sensing outcomes and making incorrect decisions) due to 
manipulation from malicious nodes, technological limitation (e.g., hardware and 
software errors), or due to environmental factors (e.g., sensors located in shadowing 
zone) [38]. As these attacks are unintentional, some measures need to be incorporated 
in the detection mechanism to ensure that these non-malicious nodes are not 
misdetected as malicious [45]. 
A.3 Random attack. In this attack, malicious nodes launch attacks at random. For instance, 
malicious nodes introduce errors in the sensing outcomes [43], or jam the channels 
randomly [39]. Such attacks affect the honest nodes so that they are unable to predict 
the malicious nodes’ next course of actions. As these attacks are hard to predict, the 
honest nodes would need to learn and re-learn the next possible course of actions to be 
taken by the malicious nodes. 
A.4 Bias attack. In this attack, malicious nodes launch attacks systematically and 
intentionally in a collaborative manner. For instance, the malicious nodes may either 
send inaccurate sensing outcomes [43], or jam the channels in order to reduce channel 
access opportunities of honest nodes [39]. As these attacks are biased, the damaging 
effects to honest nodes may be higher than that of other attacks, such as random 
attacks. 
A.5  Jamming attack. In this attack, malicious nodes keep the network busy by constantly 
sending packets on a particular channel, or intentionally cause high interference to 
disrupt the network in order to reduce the signal-to-noise ratio significantly, and 
subsequently prevent efficient utilization of the channels [36]. A malicious SU may 
choose to launch an attack on the CCC to inflict maximum damage since many 
important operations, such as the exchange of control messages, take place on the 
CCC. These control messages may include sensing outcomes, routing information and 
coordination information of channel access [46]. 
A.6  Intelligent attack. In this attack, malicious nodes maximize their attack performance 
by leveraging on AI techniques. For instance, in Sybil attack [45], which enables nodes 
to have multiple identities, the malicious nodes make use of RL to learn the optimal 
number of false sensing outcomes to subvert collaborative spectrum sensing. This is to 
prevent their malicious intentions being detected [47].  
3.3 Challenges 
There are five challenges associated with security enhancement schemes as follows: 
C.1 Dynamicity of nodes’ behavior. Nodes may change from honest to malicious as time 
progresses, and vice-versa [38]. RL has been applied to provide a dynamic and 
intelligent mechanism to monitor the nodes’ behavior at all times. 
C.2 Dynamicity of network topology. Nodes may be added or removed from wireless 
networks in the absence of a centralized base station. With such flexibility, it opens up 
security vulnerabilities as the malicious nodes could choose to leave the network either 
before they have been detected as malicious or otherwise [43]. RL has been applied to 
provide a network with honest nodes for collaboration, and hence, it improves the 
efficiency of the network. 
C.3 Dynamicity of attack strategies. Malicious nodes’ strategies may change dynamically 
and it is a challenge to keep track of the way (e.g., frequency) they attack [39]. RL has 
been applied to provide a dynamic and intelligent mechanism to learn malicious nodes’ 
strategies as time progresses. 
C.4  Dynamicity of channel access. During a channel switch, a SU chooses the next 
operating channel that provides at least, if not better, channel quality and bandwidth 
leading to network performance enhancement. However, malicious SUs may launch 
jamming attacks A(5) on those better channels, which are likely to be chosen, making 
the channel switch ineffective. RL has been applied to provide a better channel 
transition [48]. 
C.5 Allocation of data and control channels. Optimal allocation of data and control 
channels maximizes CRN performance. The allocation is vulnerable to attacks as 
malicious nodes may choose to jam the control channel to achieve maximum effects. 
RL has been applied to learn the strategy for optimal channel allocation among the 
honest SUs [49]. 
3.4 System characteristics 
The two characteristics associated with security enhancement schemes are as follows: 
H.1 Security enhancement scheme model: centralized H(1.1) or distributed H(1.2). There 
are two types of models, namely centralized and distributed models. Centralized model 
is normally embedded in a centralized entity, such as a base station or a decision fusion 
node in centralized networks; while distributed models are normally embedded in 
distributed entities, such as the hosts in distributed networks. In centralized model, a 
central node, such as a base station and a fusion center, may have the knowledge, such 
as sensing outcomes, of most of its hosts; while in distributed model, every node may 
have the knowledge of its neighbor nodes only. 
H.2 Availability of local RL-based information from neighboring nodes: available H(2.1) 
or unavailable H(2.2). The local RL-based information (i.e., state, selected action and 
received reward) from neighboring nodes may be available or unavailable to a node. 
The availability H(2.1) of the information enables nodes to make decisions on action 
selection without jeopardizing network performance of neighboring nodes; however, 
message exchanges may be necessary, and so it incurs control overhead. The 
unavailability H(2.2) of the information requires nodes to make decisions on action 
selection independently.  
3.5 Existing schemes 
The RL approach has been applied in two security enhancement schemes as follows: 
S.1 Trust and reputation management (TRM). Cooperation enables nodes to achieve, 
through collective efforts, a common or network-wide objective. During collaboration, 
the collaborating nodes exchange information and use the collective information to 
make final decisions on the action selection. While authentication, authorization and 
access control may detect the malicious nodes or manipulated information, attackers 
may still exist and manipulate the decision [45, 50]. Hence, it is necessary to detect 
malicious nodes and anomalous events, which deviate from an expected range of 
system behavior. In general, a threshold characterizes the expected range of system 
behavior. For instance, the operating parameter should be smaller than the threshold. 
TRM calculates the reputation value of each node, and subsequently uses the value to 
identify malicious users among its collaborating nodes.  
Higher reputation values indicate higher degree of legitimacy (or smaller 
deviations from the thresholds). RL has been applied in TRM to identify malicious 
nodes and address the challenge of dynamicity in the malicious nodes’ behavior C(1) 
[38].  
S.2 Anti-jamming. Due to the intrinsic nature of CRN that allows SUs to switch from one 
channel to another in order to maximize the use of the underutilized channels, this 
characteristic has opened up some security vulnerabilities. The malicious SUs may 
intentionally jam the white spaces by occupying them through constant transmission of 
signals in the white spaces [51] or by producing high interference to starve honest SUs 
and prevent them from transmitting [52]. Although malicious nodes may target other 
channels, an intelligent malicious SU node may prefer to jam control channels as it can 
cause denial of service in the networks. RL has been shown to be effective in tackling 
jamming [39] due to its ability to learn from the operating environment and adapt 
quickly to changes.  
3.6 Performance enhancements 
The RL approach has been shown to achieve the following four performance enhancements.  
E.1 Lower probability of false positive. False positive/ alarm is triggered when honest 
nodes and their respective activities are incorrectly identified as malicious in nature. 
RL can help reduce the false positives/ alarms [38, 53]. 
E.2 Higher detection rate. Detection rate is the accuracy of identifying malicious nodes. It 
can be measured in terms of the number of iterations or cycles required to detect the 
malicious nodes. RL can help improve the detection rate [43, 53]. 
E.3 Lower probability of missed detection. Missed detection happens when malicious 
nodes and their respective activities are incorrectly identified as honest nodes. With 
RL, the probability of missed detection is reduced [38, 53]. 
E.4 Higher utilization gain. Utilization gain can be measured by network performance in 
terms of data throughput, packet loss or delay. Higher utilization gain indicates higher 
data throughput, lower packet loss and lower delay. Lower utilization gain may be 
triggered by attacks, such as jamming activities caused by malicious SUs. RL can help 
improve the utilization gain [39, 48, 49]. 
3.7 The role of RL in wireless security enhancement 
To further expound on Figure 3, we present the insights on the role of RL in the aspects of applications, 
types of attacks, challenges, characteristics and security enhancement scheme in Table 4.  
  














P(1) Channel sensing RL helps honest SUs to detect white space accurately.  
P(2) Channel access RL maximizes the white spaces usage among the honest SUs without causing 
unacceptable interference to PUs.  
P(3) Routing RL ignores malicious nodes along a route in the network.  
P(4) Data sensing/ 
reporting  











A(1) Byzantine attack RL monitors the dynamicity of SUs’ behaviour so that it can detect SUs who turn 
malicious as time progresses. 
A(2) Unintentional attack RL enables honest SUs to learn and identify non-malicious SUs with malfunction 
features so as not to deprive them from collaborating with other SUs.  
A(3) Random attack RL enables honest SUs to learn the malicious SUs’ attack strategies in order to 
predict their next course of action, which is random in nature. 
A(4) Bias attack RL enables honest SUs to identify the pattern of the attacks, which is collaborative in 
nature. 
A(5) Jamming attack RL enables honest SUs to find optimal control and data channel allocation strategies 
in order to maximize channel utilization in the presence of jamming from malicious 
nodes.  
A(6) Intelligent attack RL enables honest SUs to counter malicious SUs who leverage on learning and 
intelligent mechanisms, such as learning the optimal number of false sensing 









C(1) Dynamicity of nodes’ 
behavior 
RL learns a nodes’ behavior as time progresses.  
C(2) Dynamicity of 
network topology 
RL learns and identifies honest SUs in a dynamic network environment for 
collaboration purpose.  
C(3) Dynamicity of attack 
strategies 
RL learns the malicious nodes’ strategies as time progresses. 
C(4) Dynamicity of 
channel access 
RL learns and identifies a high-quality channel during a channel switch.  
C(5) Allocation of data 
and control channels 















RL keeps learnt knowledge of all SUs in a fusion center or base station for 
decision making.  
H(1.2) 
Distributed 
RL keeps learnt knowledge of neighboring SUs in every SU for 
decision making. 
H(2) Availability of local 
RL-based 
information   
H(2.1) 
Available 
The local RL-based information from neighbor nodes is available to  
SU to make decision on action selection. 
H(2.2) 
Unavailable 
The local RL-based information from neighbor nodes is not available  




e S(1) TRM scheme RL is applied to TRM scheme to learn the reputation values of the SUs so as to detect 
malicious SUs. 
S(2) Anti-jamming RL is applied to anti-jamming scheme to learn jamming from malicious SUs so as to 
avoid those channels. 
   
 
 
4 Application of Reinforcement Learning for Security 
Enhancement in Cognitive Radio Networks 
This section presents RL models with respect to their applications, algorithms used, types of challenges 
and attacks for CRNs (see Sections 4.1 – 4.4). As a comprehensive survey article, we have included RL-
based applications in WSNs (see Section 4.5.1) and WMNs (see Section 4.5.2), which are limited in the 
literature, in order to provide further insight on the leveraging of such RL models and algorithms to 
CRNs. To do this, we describe how to address the core challenges of CRNs (such as channel dynamicity) 
while providing support to other minor challenges in CRNs, such as energy conservation while leveraging 
the RL models to CRNs. Design considerations and a guideline for the application of RL to CRN is 
provided in Section 6.1. Table 5 summarizes the RL models, which have been applied to security schemes 
in the literature. Table 5 also compares various aspects of RL models in the aspects of strength, attacks 
and challenges. The complexity of various RL algorithms has also been incorporated into the respective 
tables (Algorithms 2–7). For consistency purpose, we standardize the various notations used in the 
respective articles as shown in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 
 































































































































































































Each SU calculates a suitability value for each neighbor 
using softmax, and uses it to update the Q-value of the 
neighbor, in order to select honest neighbors for 
collaboration. 
 
The suitability value helps to calculate the Q-value 
of a state-action pair of each neighbor node 
accurately even though there may be lower number 
of honest neighbors, which may vary significantly.  
√ √ 
   
√ 




Each SU learns attack strategies from malicious SUs, 
and selects control or data channels, in order to avoid 
jammed channels. 
 
Minimax Q-learning helps SUs to learn the 
dynamic attack strategies from malicious SUs with 
reduced learning activities.  









Each SU updates the learning rate as time progresses 
and selects the next operating channel that is less likely 
to be jammed.  
The traditional RL approach is used with reducing 
learning rate while ensuring convergence in an 
operational cycle. 





RL with PHC 
and WoLF 
[49] 
Each SU updates policy in adaptation to the operating 
environment. For example, when the reward value is 
greater than its threshold (e.g., when the PU’s activity 
is low), an agent increases the policy step size, which is 
used to update the policy. This ensures faster learning 
=to avoid attacks by malicious SUs.  
The multi-agent RL model has the ability to update 
policies using different step sizes in accordance to 
the operating environment. So, it learns faster 
whenever the operating environment is favorable. 
This increases the convergence rate to the optimal 
policy. 
    
√ 




factor 𝛾 = 0 
[43] 
Each node updates Q-value with delayed reward only 
with discount factor 𝛾 = 0 in order to select a node for 
collaboration.  
This model does not depend on future rewards that 










Each node uses on policy Monte Carlo to update Q-
values and policies at the end of each episode in order 
to select an honest next hop node for data transmission. 
 
This model solves networking problems (e.g., 
routing) that are episodic in nature. Each episode 
consists of a set of consecutive actions needed to 
achieve an optimal action. 
√ 
    
√ 
    
23 
4.1 RL model with suitability value 
Vučević et al. [38] propose a RL model with suitability value for TRM S(1) applied to channel sensing 
P(1) in order to identify honest nodes for collaboration in CRNs. In this model, each node selects its 
neighbor nodes to collaborate by evaluating their suitability values, which are derived from the outcome 
of the final decisions. The suitability value is calculated using the softmax approach (see Section 2), and 
subsequently it is used to update the Q-function. Higher suitability value indicates higher probability that 
the node is chosen to collaborate. The purpose of the proposed RL model is to enable a node to monitor 
its neighbor nodes’ behavior as time progresses in order to identify honest nodes in the presence of 
Byzantine A(1) and unintentional A(2) attacks. Hence, the RL model addresses the challenge of the 
dynamicity of malicious nodes’ behavior C(1). The proposed RL model is a distributed model H(1.2), and 
it is embedded in each node. Each node makes decision independently without RL information exchange 
with neighbor nodes H(2.2). The proposed RL model has been shown to enhance the reliability of 
cooperation and specifically, it minimizes the probabilities of false alarm E(1) and missed detection E(3).  
Table 6 shows the proposed RL model at node 𝑖 for the TRM scheme in channel sensing. The state 
is not represented and so it is a stateless model. This means that the changes of the operating environment 
do not affect the node’s action selection.   
 
 
Table 6 RL model for channel sensing embedded in each node i [38].  
Action 
𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 = {0,1}, each action 𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖  represents a single collaborator node 𝑘 for information 
exchange (i.e., sensing outcome), where 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 = 1 and 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 = 0 if collaborator node 𝑘 is chosen 




𝑖 ) = 𝑁𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 , where 𝑁𝑘,𝜏
𝑖  represents the number of false alarms made by collaborator 
node 𝑘 within a time window 𝑡. Node 𝑘 experiences a false alarm whenever its sensing outcome 




Algorithm 2 presents the RL algorithm for the scheme at node 𝑖; while Figure 4 presents the 
flowchart of the algorithm. The flowchart is prepared for ease of comparison with the traditional RL 
algorithm presented in Section 2, as well as among the RL algorithms presented in this section. In this RL 
model with suitability value, the suitability value 0 ≤  𝜙𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ≤ 1 increases with Q-value, and hence, the 
updated Q-value 𝑄𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ) decreases with higher number of false alarms 𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ) as shown in 
Equation (4) in Algorithm 2. The table also shows the computational and storage complexities of the RL 
algorithm for a single node 𝑖. Since the RL is executed in a distributed network with 𝑁 SU nodes, the 
network-wide computational complexity is 𝑂(𝑁(𝑁 − 1)|𝐴|) and the network-wide storage complexity is 




Algorithm 2 RL algorithm for channel sensing embedded in each node i [38] and its complexity. 
RL algorithm Complexity 
Computational Storage 
Repeat 












2. Choose action set 𝑎𝜏
𝑖 = (𝑎1,𝜏
𝑖 , 𝑎2,𝜏
𝑖 , … , 𝑎𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 )  
3. Receive delayed reward 𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 )  
4. Update global reward 𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑎𝜏
𝑖 )  
5. For 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝑎𝜏
𝑖 , update Q-value for each 
collaborator node 𝑘: 
    𝑄𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ) ← 𝑄𝜏
𝑖(𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ) + 𝛼 ∙
[𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ) − 𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑎𝜏






















Figure 4: Flowchart of the RL algorithm with suitability value. 
 
 
4.2 RL model with minimax Q-learning 
Wang et al. [39] propose a RL model with minimax Q-learning for anti-jamming S(2) applied to channel 
access P(2) in order to maximize channel utilization in CRNs. This model learns the malicious nodes’ 
actions or strategies in a zero-sum game [54] in which the malicious nodes’ gains increase with 
decreasing gains from the honest nodes. This model updates the Q-value using a state value that is 
derived from the optimal policies by considering the worst scenario in which the malicious nodes adopt 
the best possible policies. The proposed RL model aims to enable SUs to maximize channel utilization in 
the presence of jamming attacks A(5). The malicious SUs may continually change their jamming 
strategies causing the honest SUs to also dynamically and strategically change their channel access 
policies in order to avoid the jammed channels. The malicious SU’s objective is to optimize the effects of 
the attacks on SUs with limited jamming effort. Hence, the RL model addresses the challenge of the 
dynamicity of attack strategies C(3). The proposed RL model is a distributed model H(1.2), and it is 
embedded in each node. Each node makes decision independently without RL information exchange with 
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neighbor nodes H(2.2). The proposed RL model has been shown to increase SU spectrum utilization gain 
E(4), which is defined as a function of throughput, packet loss and delay. 
Table 9 shows the proposed RL model at node 𝑖 for the anti-jamming scheme in channel access. 
As for the malicious node ℎ (which is not shown in Table 9), the action 𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
ℎ  represents malicious node 
ℎ jamming spectrum 𝑘 using previously un-attacked channels (𝑎𝑘,𝐷1,𝜏
ℎ ) or jamming previously jammed 
channels (𝑎𝑘,𝐷2,𝜏
ℎ ). Algorithm 3 presents the RL algorithm for the scheme at node 𝑖; while Figure 5 
presents the flowchart of the algorithm. The table also shows the computational and storage complexities 
of the RL algorithm for a single node 𝑖. Since the RL is executed in a distributed network with 𝑁 SU 
nodes, the network-wide computational complexity is 𝑂(𝑁(𝑁 − 1)(|𝐴|) and the network-wide storage 
complexity is ≤ (𝑁(𝑁 − 1)|𝑆||𝐴|). 
 
 







𝑖 ) ∈ 𝑆, each state 𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖  consists of four sub-states: 
 𝑃𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 = {0,1} represents the presence of PU in spectrum 𝑗 in time slot 𝜏 = Δ𝑡 
o 𝑃𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 = 1 (𝑃𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 = 0) indicates that PU is present (absent) 
 𝑔𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ {𝑔1, 𝑔2, ⋯ , 𝑔𝐽} represents node 𝑖’s gain in time slot 𝜏 = Δ𝑡 
o 𝑔1( 𝑔𝐽) indicates the minimum (maximum) gain level 
  𝐻𝑗,𝐶,𝜏
𝑖  represents the number of jammed control channels in spectrum 𝑗 in time slot 𝜏 =
Δ𝑡 
 𝐻𝑗,𝐷,𝜏







𝑖 ) ∈ 𝐴, each action 𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖  consists of four sub-actions:  
 𝑎𝑘,𝐶1,𝜏
𝑖  (𝑎𝑘,𝐷1,𝜏
𝑖 ) represents node 𝑖 transmits messages in control (data) channel selected 
from previously unjammed channel in spectrum 𝑗 
 𝑎𝑘,𝐶2,𝜏
𝑖  (𝑎𝑘,𝐷2,𝜏
𝑖 ) represents node 𝑖 transmits messages in control (data) channel selected 





𝑖  , 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
ℎ ) represents the spectrum gain when the selected channel for transmission 





Algorithm 3 RL algorithm for channel access embedded in each node i [39] and its complexity. 
RL algorithm Complexity 
Computational Storage 
Repeat 
1. Observe state 𝑠𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 
2. Choose action 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 




ℎ )  
4. For 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 , update Q-value, optimal strategy,  
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ℎ ) + 𝛾 ∙ 𝑉𝜋
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𝜋𝑖,∗(𝑠𝑗,𝜏
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Figure 5: Flowchart of the RL algorithm with minimax Q-learning. 
28 
4.3 RL model with decreasing learning rate 
Wu et al. [48] propose a RL model with decreasing learning rate for anti-jamming S(2) applied to channel 
access P(2) in order to maximize channel utilization in CRNs. This model derives the learning rate, which 
is the reciprocal of the number of updates for the Q-values of state-action pairs. Hence, the learning rate 
in this model reduces as time progresses. The purpose of the proposed RL model is to enable the SUs to 
maximize their long-term rewards in the presence of jamming attacks A(5) that may be launched at 
random, or with certain collaborative strategy, to attempt to jam the channels. The malicious SUs 
collaboratively launch attacks in order to minimize the honest SU’s utilization gain.  This may cause the 
honest SUs to dynamically and strategically change their operating channels in order to avoid the jammed 
channels. The malicious SU’s objective is to maximize the adverse effects of the attacks on SUs. Hence, 
the RL model addresses the challenges of the dynamicity of attack strategies C(3) and the dynamicity of 
channel access C(4). The proposed RL model is a distributed model H(1.2), and it is embedded in each 
node. Each node makes decision independently without RL information exchange with its neighbor nodes 
H(2.2). The proposed RL model has been shown to increase spectrum utilization gain E(4). 
Table 8 shows the proposed RL model at node 𝑖 for the anti-jamming scheme in channel access.   
In contrast to the traditional reward representation, a different reward function is applied to calculate the 





Table 8 RL model for channel access embedded in each node i [48].  
State  
𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 = {𝑃, Э ,1}, where  
 𝑃 indicates a PU occupies channel 𝑗 
 Э indicates a malicious SU jams channel 𝑗 
 1 indicates a successful transmission in channel 𝑗 
Action 
𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 = {𝑏, 𝑦}, where  
 𝑏 indicates node 𝑖 chooses to switch to another channel  





𝑖 ) represents the channel gain for selecting an unjammed channel for 
transmission. Depending on the current state and action, there are four possible rewards 𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖  
as follows:  
 𝑅                          when 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 = 𝑦 and 𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 ≠ 𝑃 or Э  
 𝑅 − 𝐶                   when 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 = 𝑏 and 𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 ≠ 𝑃 or Э  
 −𝐿 − 𝐶                 when 𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 = Э  
 −𝐶                        when 𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 = 𝑃  
 
where 𝑅 represents successful transmission gain, 𝐶 represents the cost of switching to another 
channel, and 𝐿 represents the cost incurred in choosing a jammed channel.  
 
 
Algorithm 4 presents the RL algorithm for the scheme at node 𝑖; while Figure 6 presents the 
flowchart of the algorithm. The table also shows the computational and storage complexities of the RL 
algorithm for a single node 𝑖. Since the RL is executed in a distributed network with 𝑁 SU nodes, the 
network-wide computational complexity is 𝑂(𝑁(𝑁 − 1)|𝐴|) and the network-wide storage complexity is  





Algorithm 4 RL algorithm for channel access embedded in each node i [48] and its complexity. 
RL algorithm Complexity 
Computational Storage 
Repeat 
1. Observe state 𝑠𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 
2. Choose action 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 




4. Update Q-value for node 𝑖:  
𝛼𝜏 =
1


















𝑖 )                              when (𝑎𝑘,𝜏
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Figure 6: Flowchart of the RL algorithm with decreasing rate. 
 
 
4.4 RL model with policy hill-climbing (PHC) and win-or-learn-fast (WoLF) 
Lo et al. [49] propose a RL model with policy hill-climbing (PHC) and win-or-learn-fast (WoLF) for anti-
jamming S(2) applied to channel access P(2) in order to maximize the CCC utilization in CRNs. This RL 
model aims to approximate the gradient ascent approach, which is a variant of the gradient descent 
approach [49], to adjust the step size of policy updates according to PUs’ activities and malicious SUs 
strategies. Hence, when the PU’s activity is low, WoLF increases the policy step size to ensure faster 
learning in order to avoid being attacked by the malicious SUs; and when the PU’s activity is high 
(indicating low CCC availability), WoLF reduces the policy step size to delay malicious SUs’ strategies 
[55] in order to ensure convergence to a greedy strategy. Next, the step size is used by PHC to update the 
policy using the step size given by WOLF. This RL model is multi-agent in nature because the honest 
SUs collaborate amongst themselves through message exchange (i.e., the common control information) 
using PHC and WoLF to achieve the maximum reward. The purpose of the proposed RL model is to 
enable the SUs to find an optimal control channel allocation strategy in the presence of jamming attacks 
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A(5). Hence, the RL model addresses the challenge of the data and control channel allocation C(5). The 
proposed RL model is a distributed model H(1.2), and it is embedded in each node. Each node makes 
decision independently without RL information exchange with neighbor nodes H(2.2). The proposed RL 
model has been shown to increase CCC utilization gain E(4). Table 9 shows the proposed RL model at 
node 𝑖 for the anti-jamming scheme in channel sensing.  
 
 
Table 9 RL model for channel sensing embedded in each node i [49].  
State  
𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 = {0,1}, where state 𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 = 0 and 𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 = 1 when channel 𝑗 is not occupied and 
occupied by a PU, respectively. 
Action 
𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 = {0, ⋯ , 𝐾}, where 𝑘 represents the number of CCCs selected for packet transmission 





𝑖 ) = 1/𝑈𝑗=0,𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 , where 𝑈𝑗=0,𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ≥ 0 represents the number of valid CCCs which 
are unoccupied by PUs, jammed-free and common to SUs selected for packet transmission; 
𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖 = 0 when there is no valid CCCs.  
 
 
Algorithm 5 presents the RL algorithm for the scheme at node 𝑖; while Figure 7 presents the 
flowchart of the algorithm. Note that, 𝛿 is the step size for policy update where it brings a step closer to 
the optimal policy when the action taken maximizes the Q-value. The table also shows the computational 
and storage complexities of the RL algorithm. The table also shows the computational and storage 
complexities of the RL algorithm for a single node i. Since the RL is executed in a distributed network 
with 𝑁 SU nodes, the network-wide computational complexity is 𝑂(𝑁(𝑁 − 1)|𝐴|) and the network-wide 
storage complexity is ≤ 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)|𝑆||𝐴|). Note that, the complexity of PHC and WoLF are dependent on 




Algorithm 5 RL algorithm for channel sensing embedded in each node i [49] and its complexity.  
RL algorithm Complexity 
Computational Storage 
Repeat 
1. Observe state 𝑠𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 = {0,1} 
2. Choose action 𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 = {1,⋯ ,𝐾} 
3. Receive delayed reward 𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑠𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 , 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 )  
4. For action 𝑎𝑘,𝑡






















𝑖 ) ≥ 𝑟𝑚,𝑇𝐻
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ),  then 𝛿 = 𝛿max  
else apply WoLF to obtain 𝛿 
where 𝑟𝑚,𝑇𝐻
𝑖  is the reward threshold 



























Figure 7: Flowchart of the RL algorithm with policy hill-climbing (PHC) and win-or-learn-fast (WoLF). 
 
 
4.5 RL-based security enhancements in other wireless networks 
4.5.1 Myopic approach: RL model with discount factor 𝜸 = 𝟎 
Mistry et al. [43] propose a RL model with discount factor 𝛾 = 0 for TRM S(1) applied to data reporting 
P(4) in order to manage the reputation values of decision fusion centers in WSNs (see Section 3.1.1.2). 
This model makes use of the most current reputation values of the upstream nodes for collaboration. The 
reputation value is derived from the number of accurate and inaccurate final decisions made by the 
upstream node within a time window 𝜏 = 𝑡. Since the discount factor 𝛾 = 0, the Q-value is updated using 
delayed reward only. The purpose of the proposed RL model is to enable a node to monitor its upstream 
nodes’ behavior as time progresses in order to identify honest upstream nodes, which play the role as 
decision fusion centers to aggregate sensing outcomes from downstream nodes, in the presence of random 
attacks A(3) and bias attacks A(4). Note that, with discount factor 𝛾 = 0, the future or discounted rewards 
are not considered and so only next-hop upstream nodes are considered in this model. RL has been 
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applied by downstream nodes to detect malicious next-hop upstream nodes. Hence, the RL model 
addresses the challenges of the dynamicity of malicious nodes’ behavior C(1) and the dynamicity of 
network topology C(2). The proposed RL model is a centralized model H(1.1), and it is embedded in each 
potential downstream node. Each node makes decision independently without RL information exchange 
with neighbor nodes H(2.2). The proposed RL model has been shown to be efficient and accurate in 
updating and calculating the upstream nodes’ Q-value, and hence, it increases the detection rate of 
malicious nodes E(2). 
Table 10 shows the proposed RL model at node 𝑖 for the TRM scheme in data reporting. The state 
is not represented and so it is a stateless model. This means that the changes of the operating environment 
do not affect the SU’s action selection. Algorithm 6 presents the RL algorithm for the scheme at node 𝑖; 
while Figure 2, which is the generic flowchart, presents the flowchart of the algorithm. The table also 
shows the computational and storage complexities of the RL algorithm for a single node 𝑖. The RL is 
executed in a centralized network. The network-wide computational complexity is 𝑂(𝑁|𝐴|) and the 
network-wide storage complexity is ≤ (𝑁|𝐴|). 
 
 
Table 10 RL model for data reporting embedded in each downstream node i [43]. 
Action 
𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑆 = {𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴|𝑄𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ) > 𝑄𝑡ℎ}, each action 𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖  represents a single upstream 
node 𝑘, where action 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 = 1 and 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 = 0 if upstream node 𝑘 is chosen and not chosen, 
respectively. 𝐴𝑆 represents a set of honest upstream nodes in which the reputation value of the 
upstream node 𝑎𝑘,𝜏








𝑖 + 2), where 𝑝𝑘,𝜏
𝑖  and 𝑞𝑘,𝜏
𝑖  are the number of accurate 
and inaccurate final decisions, respectively. The reward indicates the reputation value of an 




Algorithm 6 RL algorithm for data reporting embedded in each downstream node i [43] and its 
complexity.  
RL algorithm Complexity 
Computational Storage 
Repeat 
1. Choose action 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖  
2. Receive delayed reward 𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ) 
3. For action 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 , update Q-value for an upstream node 𝑘: 
          𝑄𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ) ← (1 − 𝛼)𝑄𝜏
𝑖(𝑎𝑘,𝜏

















Similar myopic approach has been applied to [53] for TRM S(1) in data reporting P(4) in order to 
detect malicious nodes in WSNs (see Section 3.1.1.2). The purpose of the proposed RL model is to 
calculate the nodes’ reputation values in order to identify honest nodes for collaboration in the presence 
of random attacks A(3). Hence, the RL model addresses the challenges of the dynamicity of malicious 
nodes’ behavior C(1) and the dynamicity of network topology C(2). The proposed RL model is a 
centralized model H(1.1), and it is embedded in a decision fusion node. Each node makes decision 
independently without RL information exchange with neighbor nodes H(2.2). The proposed RL model 
has been shown to enhance the reliability of cooperation, specifically, to minimize probabilities of false 
alarm E(1) and missed detection E(3), as well as to maximize the detection rate of malicious nodes E(2).  
Table 11 shows the proposed RL model at decision fusion node 𝑖 for the TRM scheme in data 
reporting. The state is not represented and so it is a stateless model.  This means that the changes of the 





Table 11 RL model for data reporting embedded in node i [53].  
Action 
𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝑡
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴𝑆 = {𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝑡
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴|𝑄𝑘,𝑡
𝑖 (𝑎𝑘,𝑡
𝑖 ) > 𝑄𝑡ℎ}, each action 𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝑡
𝑖  represents a single node 𝑘, 
where 𝑎𝑘,𝑡
𝑖 = 1 and 𝑎𝑘,𝑡








𝑖  is the relative error; and 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜎𝑖 are the mean and 
standard deviation of the predicted errors, respectively. The reward indicates the reputation 
value of neighbor node 𝑘. 
 
 
4.5.2 RL model with episodic rewards 
Maneenil et al. [36] propose a RL model with episodic rewards for TRM S(1) applied to routing P(3) in 
order to identify honest nodes for collaboration in WMNs (see Section 3.1.1.1). This model updates the 
Q-value with delayed reward only after an episode is completed. The purpose of the proposed RL model 
is to monitor next-hop neighboring node’s behavior as time goes by in order to identify honest nodes in 
the presence of Byzantine attacks A(1). The identified honest nodes help to forward packets towards the 
destination node; while malicious nodes may discard the packets. The proposed RL model addresses the 
challenge of the dynamicity of the malicious nodes’ behavior C(1). The proposed RL model is a 
distributed model H(1.2), and it is embedded in each node. Each node makes decision independently 
H(2.2). The proposed RL model has been shown to increase spectrum utilization gain E(4). 
Table 12 shows the proposed RL model at node 𝑖 for the TRM scheme in routing. Note that, an 
episode 𝑒𝑡 is required to establish a route. This means a selected node for a route will only receive its 
reward after a route has been established. Therefore, an honest node has higher Q-value because it has 
been regularly chosen to forward packets. Algorithm 7 presents the RL algorithm for the scheme at a 
single node 𝑖; while Figure 8 presents the flowchart of the algorithm. Since the RL is executed in a 
distributed network with 𝑁 SU nodes, the network-wide computational complexity is 𝑂(𝑁(𝑁 − 1)(|𝐴|) 




Table 12 RL model for routing embedded in each node i [36]. 
State  
 𝑠𝑗∈𝐽,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆 represents the reputation values of neighbor node 𝑗 ∈ 𝐽, where 𝐽 indicates all 
neighbor nodes of node 𝑖. 
Action 
The action 𝑎𝑘∈𝐾,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 represents the selection of a neighbor node 𝑘 to forward packets 
towards destination, where 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 = 1 and 𝑎𝑘,𝜏





𝑖 )  = +1 represents a constant value to be rewarded to all nodes within a route after 
an episode 𝑒𝜏 upon successful transmission. 
 
 
Algorithm 7 RL algorithm for routing embedded in each node i [36] and its complexity. 
RL algorithm Complexity 
Computational Storage 
Repeat 
1. Observe state 𝑠𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝑆  
2. Choose action 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ∈ 𝐴 
3. Receive delayed reward 𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑠𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 , 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 )   




𝑖 ) ← average (𝑟𝑚,𝜏+1
𝑖 (𝑠𝑗,𝜏
𝑖 , 𝑎𝑘,𝜏
𝑖 ))  






















































Figure 8: Flowchart of the RL algorithm with episodic reward. 
 
 
 5   RL Performance and Complexity Analysis 
The effectiveness and usability of RL can be measured in terms of its performance enhancements and its 
complexity. Two scenarios, namely centralized and distributed CRNs, are presented for analysis. Section 
5.1 tabulates the performance of various RL models in terms of different performance metrics, such as 
false positive, detection rate, missed detection and utilization gain. Section 5.2 discusses RL complexity 
in terms of computational and storage overhead complexities. Table 15 provides a summary of the RL 
complexities. The breakdown of the analysis can be found in sub sections 4.1 – 4.5 where the RL models 
and algorithms are presented in details.  
5.1 Performance Enhancements 
Table 13 provides a summary of the performance enhancements brought about by RL approaches in 
CRNs and other wireless networks. The performance metrics E(1) – E(4) have been previously discussed 



































E.1 Lower probability 
of false positive 
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E.2 Higher detection 
rate 
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E.3 Lower probability 
of missed detection 
√ 
     
E.4 Higher utilization 
gain 
 





5.2 Complexity analysis 
RL approaches incur computational and storage costs in terms of the time taken to calculate Q-values for 
the SUs, and the memory requirement needed to store Q-values. This section aims to discuss the 
complexity analysis of a general RL approach, which has been applied in security context. 
5.2.1 Assumptions  
In RL algorithms, SUs calculate the Q-values per time step. The values are subsequently used to detect 
malicious SUs. The following two types of general network models are considered: 
 In a centralized network, the upstream node serves as the decision fusion center. It calculates 
the Q-value of each of the downstream nodes based on their actions taken. There are 𝑁 nodes 
randomly distributed in the network.   
 In a distributed network, all SUs observe their neighbors’ action, as well as calculate and 
update their neighbors’ Q-values. There are 𝑁 SUs randomly distributed in the network with 
each SU having at most 𝑁 − 1 SU neighbors. 
For simplicity, henceforth, the nodes and SUs are referred as SUs. 
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5.2.2 Overview of a general RL model 
In this article, we analyze RL algorithms with respect to computational and storage complexities 
associated with observing the state, taking an appropriate action and receiving a delayed reward in each 
learning cycle. The complexity analysis conducted in this section is inspired by similar investigation 
performed in [56]. 
5.2.3 Complexity Analysis 
This section aims to investigate a general RL model with respect to computational and storage overhead 
complexities for the entire centralized and distributed networks, respectively. Table 14 describes the 
parameters used in the complexity analysis while Table 15 provides a summary of computational and 
storage overhead complexities for centralized and distributed networks. The breakdown of these 
complexities can be found in Algorithms 3–7. 
We define the following terms: 
 Computational complexity is the maximum number of times the RL algorithm is being 
executed in order to calculate the Q-values for all SUs in a network. The following 
calculation of complexities is for a simple and generic RL algorithm. In a centralized 
network, upon receiving actions from 𝑁 SUs, the SU (fusion center) calculates and 
updates their respective Q-values, so the computational complexity is 𝑂(𝑁|𝐴|). In a 
distributed network, each SU receives at most 𝑁 − 1 actions, so the computational 
overhead is 𝑂((𝑁 − 1)|𝐴|) at each SU; hence, with 𝑁 SUs in the network, the 
computational complexity is 𝑂(𝑁(𝑁 − 1)|𝐴|).  
 Storage overhead complexity is the amount of memory needed for the storage of the 
values during the course of a RL algorithm execution. Suppose, each SU maintains a 
table that keeps track of the Q-values. In a centralized network, each SU with non-
stateless RL model, has |𝑆||𝐴| Q-values, so the storage overhead complexity is ≤
𝑁(|𝑆||𝐴|). In a distributed network, each SU with non-stateless RL model, has |𝑆||𝐴| 
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Q-values, so the storage overhead is ≤ (𝑁 − 1)(|𝑆||𝐴|) at each SU; hence, with 𝑁 SUs 
in the network, the storage overhead complexity is ≤ 𝑁(𝑁 − 1)(|𝑆||𝐴|). 
 
 
Table 14 Parameters for complexity analysis. 
Parameter Description 
|𝑆| Number of states 
|𝐴| Number of actions for each state 
𝑁 Number of SUs in the network. 
 
 








Centralized RL with discount factor 
𝛾 = 0  












𝑂(𝑁(𝑁 − 1)|𝐴|) 
 
≤ (𝑁(𝑁 − 1)|𝐴|) 
RL with minimax Q-
learning [39] 
≤ (𝑁(𝑁 − 1)|𝑆||𝐴|) 
RL with decreasing 
learning rate [48] 
RL with PHC and WoLF 
[49] 




6 Guidelines and Design Considerations for the Application of    
RL to Security Enhancement in CRNs  
This section presents guidelines and design considerations for application of RL to security enhancement 
in CRNs. 
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6.1 Guidelines for the application of RL to CRNs 
When considering application of RL for security enhancement in CRNs, a problem or open issue at hand 
needs to be identified and well understood. This includes the objectives and purposes, as well as the 
problem statement and research questions applicable to the problem. Subsequently, the following 
questions need to be answered. We present guidelines for the application of RL to CRNs in the light of a 
sample case study [39] that we will refer to throughout this subsection. In [39], RL with minimax Q-learning 
for anti-jamming is applied to channel access in order to maximize channel utilization in CRNs. Next, we 
define the state, action and reward for the anti-jamming scheme as follows:  
a) Defining state. What are the decision making factors that an agent observe from the operating 
environment? For instance, in [39], the objectives are to counter jamming attacks in order to 
maximize spectrum utilization. Therefore, the agent represents the states with the presence of 
PU in spectrum 𝑗,  node 𝑖 gain (i.e., throughput), the number of jammed control channels in 
spectrum 𝑗, and  the number of jammed data channels in spectrum 𝑗. Upon observing the state, 
the agent makes decision on its action based on the state.  
b) Defining action. What are the possible actions that an agent can take to maximize its rewards? 
For instance, in [39], with respect to the objective of avoiding jammers, the agent must choose 
the available control and data channels to transmit. It is expected that, by choosing an action in 
an intelligent manner, the agent chooses an unjammed channel. This allows the agent to 
receive higher rewards.   
c) Defining reward. What is the expected delayed reward received (or performance enhancement 
enjoyed) by an agent after it has taken an action in the state? For instance, in [39], the delayed 
reward is the spectrum gain when the agent selects a channel that is unjammed.   
d) Choosing an algorithm. What are the objectives of the algorithm? The main objective is to 
help SUs to learn the dynamic attack strategies from malicious SUs, who tend to optimize 
their attacks. Therefore, SUs must learn to take optimal actions in the presence of worst case 
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attacks from malicious SUs. Hence, minimax Q-learning algorithm is chosen. The rest of the 
RL algorithms shown in Table 5 can be selected based on the main objective of the security 
scheme. 
6.2. Design considerations for the application of RL to CRNs 
This section presents some considerations that can be taken into account when designing a RL model for 
security enhancement in CRNs. 
6.2.1 Representation of state, action and reward types 
In CRNs, where PUs’ activities can be dynamic and unpredictable, effective application of Q-learning 
algorithm to channel sensing and channel access requires some security considerations to be met with 
regards to defining states and actions, and assigning reward values. In some operating environment where 
only one state exists, the agent independently selects and performs an action, and receives a reward. The 
agents then updates its policy based on this reward, and the next iteration starts. Such an environment is 
static, i.e., no state transition occurs as can be seen in [38, 43]. In [38, 43], the SUs do not consider the 
state of the operating environment such as PU existence. On the other hand, RL allows the operating 
environment to be expressed in a comprehensive yet condensed format to represent the real world 
environment as seen in [39] in order to learn the hostile environment. Additionally, in channel sensing, 
instead of a fixed reward value, the value may be assigned according to the current scenario or activity in 
order to avoid or detect malicious SUs. For instance, the rewards in RL models [38, 46] are derived from 
the number of channels accurately sensed and the number of valid CCCs selected, respectively. This 
reflects the currency of the given reward. Such reward variable can also be seen in RL models [39, 48]. 
6.2.2 Multi-agent RL 
The RL models discussed in this article are single-agent RL (SARL) except for [49], which is a multi-
agent RL (MARL) approach. Previous works [57 – 60] have shown that SARL performance in partially 
observable, non-Markovian and multi-agent systems can be unsatisfactory. For instance, policy-gradient 
methods [59, 60] have been shown to outperform RL, where the policy-gradient approach has been shown 
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to be more efﬁcient in partially observable environments since it searches directly for optimal policies in 
the policy space. While some work has been done in MARL environment [61, 62], such as designing 
learning policies for CRNs, some aspect of security can be taken into consideration, such as incorporating 
TRM into the MARL environment to provide an additional layer of detection for malicious SUs. 
6.2.3 Learning rate 
In an operating environment where attackers’ number and strategies are dynamic, learning rate in RL 
models can be adjusted according to the current scenario. An appropriate choice of learning rate will 
enable the SU to learn accurately from the operating environment. For instance, in [39], the learning rate 
decreases as the SU has learnt enough to exploit the operating environment, while in [46], the RL 
algorithm makes use of WoLF to adjust the learning rate based on the PU’s activity. 
6.2.4 Discount factor 
In an operating environment where the future reward accumulated by an agent is considered as important, 
the discount factor may be used for the purpose [17]. Higher value of the discount factor indicates 
stronger emphasis on maximizing the long-term reward. The RL parameter can be adjusted accordingly 
depending on the operating scenario emphasis. For instance, in [43, 53], the short-term reward (𝛾 = 0) is 
used to detect malicious nodes, while in [48], the long term reward (𝛾 = 0.95) is used. 
6.2.5 State space explosion 
State space explosion occurs when the RL algorithm is applied to a large-scale operating environment 
(which has an increased number of states and the size of each states). Such increase can incur an 
exponential growth in the learning time due to slower convergence and increased computational problems 
in terms of memory and speed. This is mainly due to the size of the Q-tables which increases growth 
exponentially. Such growth can have an adverse effect on RL algorithm’s performance, as it may not be 
able to detect malicious SU in an efficient manner.  Hence, a RL algorithm of this capacity and capability 
may need to find an alternative approach. In [63], batch RL is used to solve the state space explosion 
problem. The RL batch uses algorithms such as Fitted Q-Iteration [64] and Least-Squares Policy Iteration 
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[65] to store state-action-reward tuples and process them in batches. 
 
 
7 Open Issues 
This section discusses some open issues associated with the application of RL to security enhancement 
scheme that can be pursued.  
7.1 Balancing the trade-off between exploration and exploitation 
Yen et al. [66] show that, in a dynamic operating environment, it is possible for a Q-learning agent to be 
bounded in a small area of state space due to exploitation, and this may result in its inability to detect 
attackers’ behavior, such as honest nodes that turn malicious C(1). While it may be desirable to explore in 
a dynamic operating environment in order to increase the agent’s flexibility to adapt to the changing 
environment, pure exploration may degrade the agent’s learning capability [67]. Hence, the main 
challenge in exploration and exploitation is to find a balanced trade-off at the shortest possible time in 
order to achieve the maximum reward [68], such as higher detection rate E(2) and higher utilization gain 
E(4); and subsequently to incorporate the mechanism into RL algorithms. Traditional learning policies 
such as 𝜀-greedy, Boltzmann exploration (softmax), simulated annealing and probability matching could 
also be studied and used for comparison. Note that, in such an investigation, it is also important to find 
the convergence results of the mechanism. 
7.2 Determining the learning rate 𝜶 value 
While RL model has been shown to be effective in minimizing the probability of false positive [38] E(1), 
it has been noted in [43] that an increase in learning rate 𝛼 value may increase false positives. For 
instance, if 𝛼 = 1, the agent considers only the most current Q-value, which may not be optimal or 
accurate especially when the agent is exploring the state space. The increase in false positives is 
detrimental to RL as it falsely reports attacks or malicious nodes when there are none, leading to 
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inaccurate decisions. On the other hand, a decrease in learning rate 𝛼 value increases the missed 
detections on malicious nodes. For instance, if 𝛼 = 0, the agent relies on the previous or old Q-values 
only, which again may not be accurate especially in a dynamic operating environment, where nodes’ 
behavior may vary as time progresses, such as honest nodes that turn malicious C(1). Hence, it is 
important to find an acceptable value for 𝛼 so that false positive and missed detection rate can be at their 
lowest optimal in order to provide a more accurate and timely solution. Even-Dar et al. [69] show a 
relationship between the learning rate and the convergence rate, and their work can be further investigated 
to find the lower and upper bounds of these values in Q-learning algorithms. 
7.3 Applying the right policy  
RL algorithms are expected to detect malicious nodes in wireless networks in the shortest possible time 
(or with the highest possible convergence rate) in most sizes of state spaces.  An efficient RL algorithm 
needs to adopt a suitable policy that reflects the current status of the operating environment, where an 
honest node may turn malicious, and vice-versa C(1). The update of a policy can be performed at every 
time instant (called immediate policy) or at the end of each epoch, which consists of a number of time 
instants (called epoch policy). Higher convergence rate indicates lower number of time instants and 
epochs needed to achieve the optimal policy. Using the epoch policy [70], the efficiency of RL algorithms 
may be influenced by the policy update frequency. However, using the immediate policy may also incur 
higher learning time and this may decrease the convergence rate. Hence, further work could be carried out 
to explore suitable policies for RL algorithms in various operating environment settings in order to 
improve convergence rate. 
7.4 Ameliorating the curse of dimensionality   
While the majority of current works consider small state space only, the state space in a real-world 
environment may be large and dynamic in nature C(2) and C(4).  For instance, multi-agent reinforcement 
learning (MARL) [40] faces the curse of dimensionality problem, which results in the exponential growth 
of the state-action pairs, when the number of agents increases. As a result, the computational complexity 
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of the RL algorithm, which is the number of times the algorithm needs to be executed, increases 
exponentially too [40, 71]. This may cause the algorithm to perform poorly leading to a longer time 
required to detect malicious nodes in the network. Investigation could be carried out to incorporate 
feature selection method, which is a preprocessing step in RL to remove the unimportant features in the 
state space [55, 72]. This step reduces the dimension of data and it may improve the speed of detection of 
malicious nodes. 
7.5 Applying the right epoch time  
Given the intrinsic nature of RL where the delayed reward is received at the end of the next epoch time in 
the epoch policy, it is worth studying the duration of each time epoch in which the attackers may leverage 
a longer epoch time to dynamically change their behavior C(1) and attack strategies C(3). In the epoch 
policy, the update is only done at the end of each epoch to minimize the computational complexity [70]. 
However, longer duration of each epoch may inadvertently open up opportunities for the attackers to 
improve their attack strategies. Further work can be carried out to study the implication and various 
duration of each epoch, and the maximum allowable epoch time in order to reduce the number of attacks. 
7.6 Investigating the reward value assignment based on the severity of attacks 
An important component of a RL-based security enhancement scheme is the construction of the reward 
function. By appropriately defining the reward function, a RL scheme can help increase the detection rate 
of malicious nodes while reducing the probabilities of false alarm and missed detection. In [73], an 
investigation was conducted on when, what and how much to reward in RL. When determines the 
moment which may be the end of each epoch, subtask or other interval of task, what is the objective 
function such as duration and accuracy, and how much determines the magnitude of a reward. Similar 
study can be carried out to investigate the feasibility of assigning a reward value based on the 
consequence or impact of the attacks. In [74, 75], the authors constructed their reward functions based on 
the characteristic of the states. Further work can also be done to assign rewards based on the severity of 
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attacks. For instance, when an agent experienced an intelligent attack A(6), it should receive much lesser 
reward than that of unintentional attacks A(2). 
7.7 Using RL to predict attacks 
In Ezirim et al. [47], the attackers launch intelligent attacks A(6) by leveraging RL to maximize the 
potency of attack. For instance, in CRNs, attackers launch RL-based Sybil attacks (a form of denial-of-
service attacks) to learn the optimal number of false sensing outcomes to be sent to a fusion center 
without being detected as malicious. Such attacks may affect the accuracy of the final decisions on 
sensing outcomes, which may result in higher rate of false positives. Further work could be carried out to 
counter such intelligent attacks by using RL to predict the imminent attacks in the operating environment 
based on the SUs’ activities. 
7.8 Applying cooperative agents in MARL 
A promising approach to detect malicious nodes in CRNs is to get the neighboring nodes to collaborate. 
As shown in [76], cooperative agents in multi-agent-based RL approach can significantly improve the 
performance of a joint task, and such cooperation has been shown to speed up the learning process and 
subsequently converge sooner as compared to independent agents [77]. Further work could be carried out 
to measure the effectiveness of applying cooperative agents in CRNs. In addition to measuring the speed 
of the detection of malicious nodes in a dynamic operating environment, performance metrics, such as 




 8 Conclusions  
In this article, we presented an extensive review on the use of reinforcement learning (RL) to achieve 
security enhancement in cognitive radio networks (CRNs), as well as other wireless networks. RL is an 
unsupervised and intelligent approach that enables an agent to observe and learn about the static or 
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dynamic operating environment in the absence of guidance, feedback or the expected response from 
supervisors, and subsequently make decisions on action selection in order to achieve optimal or near-
optimal system performance. RL-based security enhancement schemes in CRNs are capable of learning 
new security attacks and to detect previously learned ones. RL-based security enhancement schemes have 
been successfully applied in a number of diverse problems, such as channel sensing, channel access, 
routing and data sensing/ reporting. This article presents the performance enhancements of security 
enhancement schemes achieved by RL: lower probability of false positive and missed detection, higher 
detection rate, and higher utilization gain. Various RL models, such as RL model with suitability value, 
RL model with minimax Q-learning, and RL model with policy hill-climbing and win-or-learn-fast have 
been studied. This article also presents a complexity analysis of these RL models, and discusses a number 
of open issues associated with RL, such as balancing trade-off between exploration and exploitation, 
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